On the Philosophical Project of German Idealism

Abstract

The paper shows that the common interpretation of classic German philosophy as the culmination of the Cartesian tradition is inaccurate; it contradicts the very project of German idealism: to respond to issues that Descartes was unable to resolve and that, eventually, led to the crisis of the Enlightenment. In this sense, it would be much more proper to say that German idealism is not a radical development but rather an important break with the Cartesian tradition. Through analyzing the main topics of German Idealism and the development of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel's philosophical systems, the author argues that the German idealism is the growing reaction against subjectivism that is accompanied by persistent effort to break the «closed circle» of individual consciousness; it is an attempt to prove the reality of the external world and to break out of the egocentric predicament. German Idealism's critique of subjectivism and its attempt to come up with a non-contradictory form of realism served as internal impulses that defined its own development. Thus, it conceptually grew out of the crisis of Enlightenment. All its varying forms - the transcendental idealism of Kant, the ethical idealism of Fichte, and the absolute idealism of late Schelling and Hegel - were nothing else but different attempts to resolve the aporias of Enlightenment