Without Windows and Parts: Thing-in-Itself, Phenomenon, and Something Unknowable in the Critique of Pure Reason

Abstract

The article highlights and analyzes Kant’s method in constructing the “cognitive faculty” and building transcendental philosophy as a whole, which consists in replacing distinction with division and terminology with naming and renaming. Terminological analysis complements conceptual analysis in the study. Kant’s main division – between phenomenon and thing-in-itself in the Critique of Pure Reason I consider from the point of view of mereology. I analyze the method of introducing these terms and their functions within the Kantian system. The characteristics of the thing-in-itself and phenomenon in a number of representative German publications become a topic of critical reflection. Kant transforms the distinction between an object and its modes of givenness into a division between a thing-in-itself and a phenomenon. The object is transformed into a thing-in-itself, its modes of givenness into a phenomenon as an object of empirical contemplation. Kant further applies the same method to the phenomenon: the phenomenon is divided into matter and form, preparing the subsequent Kantian division, which plays a decisive role in the Critique of Pure Reason: the “pure form” is separated from the form of empirical contemplation; through this procedure two pure forms of sensibility are introduced – space and time. One can consider the replacement of distinction with division as a deformation of the description of experience. I interpret the functions of Kant’s terms “transcendental object” and “transcendental subject” as a background of corresponding sphere of experience and compare their meaning with the meaning of the terms “thing-in-itself” and “noumenon”. Thus the positive functions of these two unknowable X become possible. However, Kant separates the background from perceived objects by characterizing them as unknowable. In conclusion, I put forward a hypothesis about the anthropomorphic origin of the thing-in-itself. The two main functions of thing-in-itself make it possible to interpret it as a means without any end.