Rickert’s conception of reality and methodology of human sciences

Abstract

НАСТОЯЩИЙ МАТЕРИАЛ (ИНФОРМАЦИЯ) ПРОИЗВЕДЕН, РАСПРОСТРАНЕН И (ИЛИ) НАПРАВЛЕН ИНОСТРАННЫМ АГЕНТОМ ЮДИНЫМ ГЕОРГИЕМ БОРИСОВИЧЕМ, ЛИБО КАСАЕТСЯ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ ИНОСТРАННОГО АГЕНТА ЮДИНА ГЕОРГИЯ БОРИСОВИЧА

18+

Methodology of human science has been deeply influenced by the Neo-Kantian position in the dispute over human sciences at the turn of
19th—20th centuries. Nowadays we know Heinrich Rickert mostly due to his justification of human science as separated from natural sciences. Rickert’s conception of “science of reality” aimed at solving key epistemological problems of its time and had long-lasting effect on sociology. However, Rickert’s notion of “reality” results from his attempt to synthesize essentially heterogeneous philosophical systems and is tightly connected with his ontology. This paper demonstrates that neo-Kantian theory of cognition conceals fundamentaland unresolved contradiction between Kantian justification of science and onto-theology of Hegel and Lotze. Crucial aporias in the methodology of human sciences can be largely explained by the ambiguity of the Neo-Kantian concept of “reality”.